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Preface
The EMS began functioning on  13  March  1979. 
was set up following the Resolution of the
European Council on the establishment of the
EMS and related matters on  December  1978 
Brussels and implemented by an agreement
between the central banks of the European
Community. There were many at the time, in both
academic and political circles, who did not foresee
a long life for Europe s effort at closer monetary
co-operation. But the EMS has not only survived,
it has been a great success in achieving its primary
goal of monetary stability. The EMS, with its
exchange rate commitment, has become the focus
of Community efforts to bring about convergence
of economic policy and performance. It has helped
pave the way for the Single European Act and the
completion of the large internal market by  1992.
The EMS has proved its worth through .difficult internal and external
circumstances. It has given the rest of the world a concrete example of the
Community s capacity to act together and create an island of stability in an ocean
of monetary turbulence. The System has been flexibly managed and adapted to
changing circumstances, in particular it was strengthened by the Basle/Nyborg
agreement. Continued development of its mechanisms and management will
provide the monetary stability which has to accompany the fullliberalisation of
capital movements in the Community and the creation of a common financial area
as part of the large internal market. Its offspring, the ecu, has become one of the
world's major international currencies, representing the Community as a whole
on the international monetary scene. The EMS and the ecu have given Europe
a strong monetary identity.
The Community countries explicitly recognized the important role of the EMS
and the ern in the further development of the Community by including reference toboth in the Single ~uropean Act. Upon completing the large internal market in  1992,
the most visible factors separating national economies will be adjustable exchange rates.
The economies of Europe will not be fully integrated until individuals and enterprises
can take long-term economic decisions on matters such as investment, production and
employment without having to worry about differing interest rates or changing exchange
rates. Further progress towards economic and monetary union would considerably add
to the berufits that will flow from the completion of the large internal market The EMS
in its ten short years, has already brought us a long way along this path I am sure it
can help us to go much further.
Jacques DEWRS
President
of the Commission
of the European Communities.
Brussels, March  1989.The EMS:  Ten years of progress 
European monetary  co-operation
1. Introduction
After ten years of existence, the European Mone-
tary System (EMS) has proved to be a convin-
cing success. It is the cornerstone upon which
European monetary co-operation is built. It pro-
motes lower inflation and brings more stable
exchange rates, thereby fostering healthy econo-
mic growth. It is a vital element in the Commu-
nity' s strategy to complete the large internal
market by 1992. It is a step along the path
towards the agreed goal of economic and mone-
tary union.
The EMS is an evolving and flexible system in
a changing monetary and fmancial environment.
It has seen the dollar first double then halve in
value. It is coping with the technological revo-
lution in the world's financial markets and major
moves of capital liberalization. It has twice been
strengthened, in 1985 and again in 1987. It has
remained strict enough to maintain an effective
monetary constraint and bring about a more
general convergence of economic policies and
performances.
The ecu is intimately linked to the EMS. The ecu
has in its ten years of existence grown very fast
and is maturing into a true currency. The increa-
sing credibility of the EMS, and the stability
imparted by the EMS to the component curren-
cies of the ecu, have been important factors in
the extensive use made of the ecu by the world'
financial sector. Its use in European commercial
transactions is now beginning to take off.
Although central banks keep substantial reser-
ves in these "private" ecus, the "official" ecu crea-
ted by theEMCF for the use of Community
central banks in the EMS has fallen well short
of its intended role.
2. The EMS in perspective
The EMS was established to pursue three main
objectives:
to attain a zone of internal and external
monetary stability in Europe (involving both
low inflation and stable exchange rates) ;
to provide the framework for improved eco-
nomic policy co-operation between Member
States, leading to more convergence in eco-
nomic performance, as well as better growth
and increased employment;
to help to alleviate global monetary instabi-
lity through common policies vis- vis third
currencies and by spreading the impact of
external monetary shocks over all participant
currencies.
The European Monetary System (EMS) also has
a role in the wider context of economic and
monetary union, which was endorsed by the
Community Heads of State or Government at
The Hague in December 1969. The collapse of
the Bretton Woods system, the fIrSt oil shock and
sharp divergences in monetary and economic
policies during the seventies, slowed the progress
towards this union. The "Snake exchange rate
system, which was set up as part of a plan to
reach monetary union by stages, was reduced
over the years to a small block.
In 1979, the process of monetary co-operation
was relaunched by the setting up of the EMS and
the creation of the ecu. Thus the EMS can also
be seen as a pragmatic attempt to progress along
the road to economic and monetary union. The
Single European Act adopted in 1986 formally
establishes this link.3. Three phases  in the evolution'  However, the ecu was still not treated in all Mem-
of the EMS 
ber States as a foreign currency.
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Looking back at how the EMS has functioned
over the last ten years, it is possible to distinguish
three main phases:
1979-1983
For its first four years, the EMS required a lear-
ning process on the part of its participants. Eco-
nomic divergences were still relatively substantial
during those early years : inflation was high and
differentials between EMS countries were large;
current account performances were varied; bud-
get deficits were often very sizeable and some-
times partially fmanced by monetary means. The
dollar was strong.
Realignments. were frequent during the fIrSt years
of the EMS, but gradually they moved from
being passive reactions to differing inflation
levels to being instruments in the efforts to reduce
inflation. Thus realignments came to be accom-
panied by domestic adjustement measures and
inflation differentials were brought down. In
contrast to during the nineteen-seventies, econo-
mic divergences giving rise to external disequi-
libria were becoming more and more matters for
changes in internal economic policy as well as
realignments.
During this period also, the financial use of the
ecu by the private sector began to expand rapidly.
Its property as a ready-made vehicle for currency
diversification and the relative stability of the
EMS, gave both investors and borrowers percei-
ved advantages in using the ecu as a currency for
borrowing and lending. An active interbank
market for .ecu credits and deposits developed.
The US dollar s rapid fall from its peak in
February 1985 provided a difficult international
monetary background for the EMS. Financial
innovation was continuing apace. In spite of this
turbulencx; there were only two general EMS rea-
lignments during this period - one in April
1986, the other in January 1987 - each consi-
derably smaller than its predecessor. Inflation
and inflation differentials were steadily brought
down, helped by falling commodity prices.
During 1985 there was a fIrst set of changes
albeit minor, to the EMS rules (see Annex I).
These were designed to allow the role of the offi-
cial ecu to grow. Although the 1985 package had
little effect, it marked a fIrSt tentative consensus
on the overall management of the EMS and con-
fumed the willingness of its participants to move
forward constructively.
This was a period during which the EMS policy
consensus came to be translated more and more
into convergent economic performances. There
was also agreement emerging in the Community
on the need to fully libera1izecapital movements
as part of the strategy to complete the large inter-
nal market by 1992.
In the aftermath of the January 1987 realign-
ment, which took place after EMS tensions had
been exacerbated by the weakness of the dollar
these two factors of better convergence and capi-
tal liberalization gave the impetus towards agree-
ment on a second, more substantial package of
measures to strengthen the EMS. The so-called
Basle/Nyborg" agreement of September 1987(see Annex II) took account of the improved, but
by no means perfect, convergence situation by
providing for a more balanced implementation
of the exchange rate commitment by all parti-
cipants. While the fundamental objectives and
rules of the EMS remained unaltered, the mea-
sures adopted were designed to further promote
the co-ordination of economic policies through
the surveillance of various economic indicators
and to refine the EMS intervention and credit
mechanism in order to counter the potential of
larger speculative flows coming in the wake of
capital liberalization.
A fIrst revision of the ecu basket was carried out
in September 1984, readjusting the component
currencies' weights and including the drachma,
with little disturbance to the ecu markets. The
ecu markets developed rapidly during the period
of EMS exchange rate stability from March 1983
to April 1986. However afterwards, its use by the
fmancial sector stagnated somewhat as EMS ten-
sions encouraged currency speculation, and ster-
ling depreciated sharply. By the summer of 1987
the ecu was treated throughout the Community
as a foreign currency.
1987 onwards
The Basle/Nyborg agreement marked the begin-
ning of a new'phase for the EMS. It is already
possible to draw the preliminary conclusion from
the short experience since September 1987 that
the Basle/Nyborg measures have had an extre-
mely beneficial effect. In the fIrst place, although
inflation differentials have changed little, inte-
rest rate differentials, especially short-term, have
narrowed dramatically. This is an indication of
the increased confidence shown by the markets
in the stability of the EMS parity grid. Secondly,
there has not been a realignment in the EMS for
over two years now. Even the gyrations of the US
dollar, which touched all-time lows against the
DM at the end of 1987, have not triggered an
EMS realignment. The EMS commitment of
monetary policies have gained in credibility and
markets have become more cautious.
The Community's progress towards completing
the large internal market seems to have further
boosted interest in the ecu. Its financial use has
grown substantially once more. Also it is begin-
ning to take off as a currency for accounting, pri-
cing and settling internatonal transactions within
Europe.
4. Why is  the EMS a success?
The EMS has been a prime factor contributing
to the improved monetary stability in Europe
seen in recent years. Cost and price inflation have
fallen further and converged more rapidly in
EMS countries than in the rest of the Commu-
nity. Exchange rate variability is much lower for
EMS currencies than for other major currencies
(see Annex II!). Interest rate variability is no hig-
her than elsewhere, and average levels are pro-
bably lower because of the smaller exchange rate
risk associated with EMS currencies. Realign-
ments have become less frequent and smaller in
size. The misalignments which have so distorted
the international monetary system over the past
years have been avoided within the EMS. Mone-
tary cooperation has advanced. Its effect on eco-
nomic policy co-ordination has, however, been
limited. Some doubts persist as to the beneficial
influence of the EMS on growth.The EMS and economic policy
convergence
The effects of the EMS monetary constraint on
policy have been substantial, but concentrated,
naturally, in the monetary area. Nevertheless
important pressures have been brought to bear
on other policy areas.
General policy stance
Real economic divergences as manifested in
external disequilibria have come to be regarded
basically as matters for domestic adjustment
measures, rather than for realignments (external
adjustment). This is partly because inflation rates
have converged but devaluation is no longer
regarded as the easy option. Exchange rates are
being used to keep downward pressure on infla-
tion, rather than accommodating inflation, and
realignments have tended to lag behind inflation
(see Annex IV).
It is true that non-participating countries, in par-
ticular  the UK and Spain, have shown similar
convergence until recently to that of Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM) countries. One reason
may be that the EMS zone has itself formed a
reference point for non-participating currencies
without which their performance may have been
less convergent. On the other hand, these coun-
tries have recently experienced a resurgence of
inflation which may have been avoided had they
been participating in the ERM.
Monetary policy
As is to be expected, monetary policies have con-
verged during the EMS period. Monetary policy
bas taken ilitich of the adjustment burden. This
is natiiffil in Hie short term because the EMS is
a mbfl~1:ary systdji ffowever, it would perhaps
be wdHYing H:l the idhger term if it persisted
because the policy-mix would become distorted
through putting excessive weight on monetary
policy. Such a development may occur because
the EMS constraint on fiscal policy is less direct.
Of course, given the EMS goal of monetary sta-
bility, most monetary convergence has come
about because of tightening in high inflation
countries, but occasionally there has been some
symmetry in monetary adjustment. For exam-
ple, temporary monetary loosening is seen in
strong currency countries in times of EMS strain
(e.g. Nov.lDec. 1987). In spite of this, there are
no signs of inflation strategy being compro-
mised. Monetary targetting has still proved pos-
sible in Germany. German inflation has in fact
been lower than Swiss inflation since 1979. Bun-
desbank monetary policy has provided an
anchor for the EMS.
Budget policies
Success in monetary convergence has made dif-
ferences and inconsistencies in budgetary policy
more apparent. Budgetary policy stances
diverged sharply during the first years of the
EMS. Differences have been reduced somewhat
since then, but discrepancies between public
finance situations are still very large. Looking at
the evolution of public debt, the story is slightly
more encouraging, but far from satisfactory.
On the other hand, the fact that monetary
growth has converged more than budget deficits
shows that monetary financing of budget defi-
cits must have declined. This is one area, con-
cerning budgets, in which the EMS does appear
to have had a significant direct impact. The con-
sequence in terms of a narrowing of long term
interest rate differentials, particularly during the
last few years, is evidence of this phenomenon.Current account imbalances and their financing
The EMS has, during most of its existence, ope-
rated against the background of widely divergent
current account situations. This has been associa-
ted with the rising real exchange rates experien-
ced in those countries with relatively high inflation
as they use the EMS constraint to bear down on
price levels. This phenomenon is reflected in fal-
ling real exchange rates in low inflation countries.
It seems more likely, however, that the major fac-
tors behind the differing current account situa-
tions of EMS countries are more structural in
nature.
Capital inflows to finance current account defi-
cits have generally taken place through the mar-
ket rather than by way of EMS credit mechanisms.
The EMS has not led to extensive use of official
Community fmancing and hence borrowing sub-
ject to conditionality, the notable exception being
France in 1983, where the EMS played its part.
The rare use of financing with conditionality
could be interpreted as an opportunity lost in the
EMS context for bringing more disciplinary pres-
sure to bear. In fact, the external imbalances have
tended to appear more on the surplus side in
recent years.
The Very Short-4erm Financing (VSTF) facility in
the framework of the EMS exchange rate mecha-
nism  intervention obligations has been used as
intended in a reasonable manner to fmance neces-
sary interventions, without deteriorating into a
balance of payments fmancing facility.
Growth strategy
The EMS is sometimes criticized for having a low
growth bias. Certainly the growth records of ERM
countries have tended to be behind those of Com-
munity non-ERM countries as well as of the US
and Japan. Their inflation performance has,
however, been better, apart from Japan. One rea-
son for this is that many ERM countries started
in the EMS in a poor position requiring substan-
tial adjustment.
Unless one believes that there is a trade-off bet-
ween inflation and growth, it is difficult to argue
that it is the EMS itself which has restricted
growth. The EMS certainly shows up clearly the
interdependence between Community economies,
which exists anyway. The absence of the EMS
would have been unlikely to have significantly
increased the growth of domestic demand in Ger-
many, indeed the opposite may well have occur-
red. On the other hand, the EMS adjustment rules
have not pushed Germany to test if stronger
growth would have been compatible with its infla-
tion target. Only a system such as the EMS
however can form the basis for macro-economic
cooperation which will permit both more growth
and greater stability.
EMS rules and procedures
It is important to analyse how the EMS has
helped achieve its goals. The EMS is founded on
an agreement between central banks and has a set
of rules and procedures. These are essential ele-
ments in its performance. They involve a compro-
mise between the needs to be stability oriented but
flexible.
The EMS is a formal an public commitment (in
contrast to the present G-7 framework). This ser-
ves to make exchange rates highly conspicuous.
It provides for realignments which have become
media events. Exchange rate changes are effec-
tively condensed into one weekend. This con-
trasts with floating currencies where movements
do not take place by realignment and are lessnoticed. EMS fluctuation limits are visible and
known. The level of commitment embodied in
the agreement to keep to fixed margins streng-
thens the credibility of the EMS by acting as a
constraint on subsequent policy choices.
Basically, the EMS contains only two principal
rules (respect of the fluctuation margins and rea-
lignments by common accord). These rules set
a framework involving a minimum but effective
constraint.
- The 2.250/0 fluctuation margin rule pro-
vides for relatively narrow and absolute limits
to currencies movements between realign-
ments. It is a strict rule, both as compared
to target zones and in respect of the width of
the margins. This has the drawback of
perhaps causing realignment speculation
when or even before the margins are attained,
whereas a soft margin may not. But it has the
advantage of forcing adjustment measures
usually well before exchange rate tensions
become serious. Fixed margins are credible
in the markets. The divergence indicator was
meant to have elements of a soft margin
(early warning, adjustment expected), but it
has not had its intended effect, mainly
because of its symmetric construction which
contrasts with the EMS objective of low
inflation.
At  2.25 0/0, the margins were extremely
narrow and constraining in the short term
while inflation differentials were substantial
during the first years of the EMS. Recent pro-
gress on convergence to low levels "Of infla-
tion has widened the margins in terms of
inflation differentials. The emphasis has now
moved to allowing currencies to fluctuate
within the ERM margins in order to discou-
rage speculation and thereby reduce the num-
ber of realignments. Until Italy, the UK and
Spain join the present 2.25 % band, the ques-
tion of narrowing the margins is not likely to
come to the fore. The Italian use of 6 % mar-
gins has permitted a lesser degree of conver-
gence in both the monetary and budgetary
areas, but it may be argued that a more
forceful convergence process would have been
unsustainable.
- EMS realignments take place by com.
mon accord. They are not unilateral deci-
sions. This contrasts with the practice in
previous exchange rate systems, such as Bret-
ton Woods and the Snake, where realign-
ments were effectively decided by the country
changing its parity with little multilateral dis-
cussion. The joint nature of EMS realign-
ment decisions is helped by the visibility of
ecu central rates which show that in fact all
rates change when one currency moves vis-
vis the others. Unanimity at realignments
reinforces credibility in that all participants
are committed to the new parity grid. Una-
nimity is also an important safeguard against
competitive devaluations, therefore helping
to maintain the predictability of exchange
rates in the EMS. The fact that the EMS
functions in the Community framework has
reinforced its multilateral nature compared
to previous exchange rate systems.
In spite of these rules, the EMS remains flexi-
ble in the face of the ever-changing monetary
environment. An example of the flexibility of
EMS rules is the use of intramarginal inter-
ventions. Moreover, EMS procedures can also
be changed, e.g. Very Short ~erm Financingmechanism, use of the dollar for EMS inter-
vention instead of participating currencies,
the introduction of monitoring and surveil-
lance, the 1985 and 1987 reinforcement
packages.
The EMS does not include any procedure
requiring explicit co-ordination of exchange
rate policies vis- vis third currencies. Such
co-ordination does take place outside Com-
munity fora between some Member States.
This may be considered a shortcoming given
the tensions that can be caused by dollar
movements. Had the ecu been placed truly
at the centre of the System, an external
dimension to the EMS may have been easier
to accomplish. In fact the official ecu has not
played more than a minor role in the func-
tioning of the EMS. It has not developed into
a reserve asset as was originally intended,
although it has played a certain role concer-
ning the credit mechanisms. Nevertheless, its
circuit has been enlarged to include "Other
Holders" apart from Community central
banks, such as the Bank for International
Settlement and the Swiss National Bank.
5. The  EMS: challenge for the
future
The EMS is a monetary system with principally
monetary, but also broader, economic conse-
quences. In its ten years of existence, the EMS
has come to be a major success in promoting clo-
ser monetary co-operation. Internal adjustment
tends now to take precedence over external
adjustment when economies diverge. But the les-
ser success on convergence in budget policies has
led to tensions in the policy-mix.
The rules and procedures of the EMS have been
important in its success. They have been strict
enough to prevent short-term pressures from
diverting the attention of governments from the
medium-term goal of an area of monetary sta-
bility. Yet they have been flexible enough to allow
changes in emphasis and strategy in the face of
a varying monetary environment.
The EMS, by stabilizing exchange rates, has con-
tributed to general economic integration. Busi-
ness does not have to worry so much about
exchange rate misalignments. Exchange rates
have become more predictable, allowing more
trade and production on an international basis
rather than on a national basis. The very exis-
tence of the EMS has paved the way for the Sin-
gle European Act and is a cornerstone for the
development of the large internal market. Its suc-
cess is important in moving towards the long-
term goal of economic and monetary union, but
it has to face successfully the challenge of the full
liberalization of capital movements, which will
take effect for ERM countries by 1 July 1990.
It must be ensured that the EMS is well equip-
ped to cope with this.ANNEX I
The 1985 package of measures designed
to strengthen the EM S
During its meeting of 12 March 1985, the Com-
mittee of Central Bank Governors of the EEC
approved a set of measures to strengthen the
EMS.
The new measures, which are designed to
improve the usability of the official ecu, are as
follows:
1. A new mobilisation mechanism has been
introduced to enable EEC central banks with
a need for intervention currencies to mobi-
lise a certain part of their official ecu hol-
dings. The EEC central banks have
committed themselves to cover such mobili-
sation operations by providing dollars.
2. The payments ratio which limits settlements
in official ecus of obligations arising out of
the use of very short-term financing will
remain at 50 % as a general rule but this limit
will be waived if and to the extent that the
recipient central bank is itself a net debtor in
ecus.
3. Remuneration of net positions in ecus and of
ecu-denominated claims under the very short-
term fmancing facility will be iIriproved ; the
interest rate (currently the weighted average
of the official discount rate of the Member
States) will henceforth be based on a weigh-
ted average of representative money-market
rates in member countries.
4. Central banks of non-member countries and
international monetary institutions such as
the Bank for International Settlements which
are accorded the Status of "Other Holder
by the EMCF Board will he enabled to obtain
official ecus from EEC central banks by
means of sale and repurchase agreements or
reversible swap transactions. ANNEX II
Baste/Nyborg package of September 1987
strengthening the EMS
At their informal meeting in Nyborg, Denmark,
on 12 September, the Ministers of Economics
and Finance agreed on a series of moves to
strengthen the EMS and fully concurred with the
measures agreed earlier by the central bank
Governors in Basle.
The strengthening of the EMS should be seen
in the light of the much improved, but by no
means perfect, convergence of economic poli-
cies and performances in the Community, as well
as of the risks posed to the cohesion of the
System by the Community's move towards full
capital .liberalization.
The set of measures agreed by Ministers and
Governors to strengthen the EMS fall into two
main categories:
A. Measures designed to increase conver-
gence and avoid conflicting policies
which would threaten the cohesion of
the System:
- A six-monthly Monetary Committee sur-
veillance procedure using economic indi-
cators and projections (in line with the G- 
framework) will be carried out, designed
to highlight any policy inconsistencies bet-
ween EMS countries and incompatible
approaches to third currencies.
- A Monetary Committee monthly exami-
nation of the latest exchange and interest
rate developments has been set up to con-
sider what conclusions can be drawn.
- A Committee . of Governors monthly
monitoring procedure will take place,
focussing on simultaneous consideration
of intervention, exchange rate and interest
rate policies to discuss appropriate policy
responses regarding not only EMS curren-
cies but also third currencies and the ecu.
These procedural improvements are backed by
a consensus to lay emphasis on the use of inte-
rest rate differentials to defend the stability of
the EMS parity grid, to use the permitted fluc-
tuation margins flexibly in order to deter specu-
lation and to avoid prolonged bouts of
intra-marginal intervention; also realignments
should be infrequent and as small as possible.
With respect to third currencies, since their move-
ments can cause disturbances in the EMS, any
potential incompatible approaches involving
major third currencies will be kept under close
review.
B. Measures to improve the intervention
mechanism of the EMS:
- In the future, there will be a presumption
that the Very Short~erm Financing
(VSTF) facility shall be available within
specified limits (1) for intramarginal inter-
ventions. Up to now VSTF use via the
European Monetary Cooperation Fund
(EMCF), under which the intervening
central bank borrows a strong currency
from the issuing central bank forinterven-
tion purposes, has only been available
when the currencies areat-their margins
and intervention is obligatory, at which
point VSTF fmancing is automatic. In the
past, intramarginal intervention has nor-
mally been funded by the weak currency
central bank from its reserves, usually of
, subject to the accord of the other
central bank concerned which was gene-
rally forthcoming. Under the new formula
the permission of the central bank issuingthe intervention currency will still be requi-
red for intramarginal intervention, but
there will be a presumption that intramar-
ginal intervention agreed to will qualify for
the VSTF facility within th~ abovementio-
ned limits and subject, when appropriate,
to certain conditions (concurrent use of
own reserves, reimbursement in the credi-
tor s currency).
- The duration of the VSTF facility will be
extended by one month, taking the maxi-
mum duration from two and a half to
three and a half months. The initial fman-
cing operation will still be automatically
renewable for a further three months, but
the ceiling on automatic renewal will be
doubled to twice the debtor quota in the
STMS mechanism.
- The acceptance limit for settlement in offi-
cial ecus of VSTF debts has been raised
from 50 610 to 100 610 for a trial period of
two years.
The presumption of VSTF availability for infra-
marginal interventions is potentially by far the
most important of the above category of mea-
sures, but its impact will have to be seen in the
light of experience since it is not automatic. The
availability of the VSTF facility will "officialize
intramarginal intervention, which was not expli-
citly foreseen in the original EMS texts, but
which has become standard practice. It will
become more symmetric in its monetary effect
in the strong and weak currency countries and
it will add to the central banks' defences against
speculative capital movements. Extending the
duration for the VSTF and raising the ceiling on
its renewal takes account of the larger capital
flows and the tendency for these flows to take
longer to reverse in the context of small realign-
ments. The raising of the official ecu acceptance
limit will add to the usability of the official ecu
which at present effectively provides a way of
using dollar and gold reserves for credit against
Community currencies; it will thus in practice
enlarge the potential funds available for inter-
vention  purposes.
This agreement marks a substantial step forward
for monetary cooperation in the Community. It
constitutes the beginning of a new phase for the
EMS, creating in a flexible way a better-balanced
System while maintaining the primary objective
of establishing a greater degree of internal (pri-
ces) and external (exchange rates) stability in
Europe. The agreement incorporates the G- 
indicator exercise, adapting it to EMS circums-
tances by laying more emphasis on the mainte-
nance of exchange rate stability, and thereby takes
account of international discussions.
(I) The limits are double the debtor quota of the Short.:ferm
Monetary Support (STMS) mechanism (Germany, France:
ECU 3 48Om; Italy: ECU 2,32Om; Belgium, The Nether-
lands: ECU 1 16Om ; Demruu-k: ECU 52Om; Ireland:
ECU 200m).A
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.ANNEX IV
GRAPH I
Exchange rate and price level relative to Germany
(by country - base 79(1) = 100)
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GRAPH II
Interest rate  and inflation  differential with Germany
(by country)
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